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Philosophy and Liturgy Part 1 
Liturgy and the Philosophy of Action  
 
Abstract: In this article, I summarise recent philosophical work on the philosophy of liturgy. In 
part 1 of this article, I consider how liturgy can provide a way of acting. I outline the importance 
of a liturgical script for enacting a liturgy, as well discussing the role of the body in acting 
liturgically. I conclude by considering the corporate dimension of liturgical action.  
 
Keywords: Liturgy, philosophy of action, scripted action, embodiment, collective-intention, 
joint-agency.  
 
A Liturgical Turn in the Philosophy of Religion 
For the most part, philosophy of religion in the past century has concerned itself with clarifying 
and evaluating religious beliefs.1 Yet, as some philosophers have pointed out, there is a disparity 
between what occupies the minds of religious believers and what philosophers of religion focus 
on. As Mark Wynn describes this disparity, there appears to be a different set of questions ‘on 
the street’ than those that philosophers occupy themselves with answering (2012, 12). These 
questions, as Wynn goes on to describe them, are concerned not with apologetic concerns, but, 
rather, with a certain way of life (2012, 12). A key component of the religious way of life which 
philosophers have often ignored, as Kevin Schilbrack points out, is that of certain ritual practices 
(2014, 17).  
 Nicholas Wolterstorff, one of the leading thinkers in the philosophical study of liturgy, 
echoes this concern in the conclusion of his 1990 essay on liturgy. He writes,  
 
Christian existence incorporates Christian belief and Christian ethical action, Christian 
experience and Christian ritual. In our century we who are Christian philosophers have 
thought especially about Christian belief and Christian ethics, somewhat about Christian 
experience. We have thought scarcely at all about Christian liturgy…. Someone might 
reply…that it shows…that there is little of interest for philosophers in liturgy. If I have 
done nothing else in this essay, I hope I have made you suspect, if not actually believe, 
that this is false. It would be a pity if philosophers had nothing to say about this 
fundamental dimension of Christian existence. (1990, 157).  
 
Whilst the progress Wolterstorff envisaged might have been slower than anticipated, nearly 30 
years after these words were published, the philosophical landscape is starting to show signs of 
taking these concerns seriously. As James K.A. Smith describes it, there has been something of a 
‘liturgical turn’ (2018, 118) in philosophy of religion in both the analytic and continental 
traditions.2 Philosophers have begun to take note of the philosophical issues which arise from a 
focus away from religious beliefs and onto certain practices, more specifically, the practices 
involved in the liturgy of the Church. In this article, I outline some of these recent philosophical 
discussions of liturgical practice and consider how this discussion might develop in the future.  
 
  
                                                     
1 Two notable exceptions, perhaps, are the much-discussed problem of petitionary prayer and the nature of religious 
experience. Other than this, a cursory glance at the contents pages of recent collections in philosophy of religion or 
analytic theology will reveal a focus primarily on the question of whether belief in God is rationally defensible and 
whether Christian doctrine is logically coherent.  
2 In this article, I primarily cover analytic work on liturgy. Whilst I do consider some work which is broadly in the 
continental tradition (Smith 2009, 2013, 2017; Benson 2013), I omit other recent continental discussions for sake of 
brevity and clarity. For other recent discussions of liturgy in continental philosophy, see Christina M. Gschwandtner 
(2015; 2013,163-183) and John D. Caputo (2007).  
Defining Liturgy 
First, we should note the complexity of the term ‘liturgy’ as it is used in the philosophical 
literature. ‘Liturgy’ has been used broadly to denote all goal orientated practices or rituals in 
human life, but also much more specifically, to refer only to certain practices of the gathered 
Church.  
In the broad sense of the word, Bruce Ellis Benson, writes that, ‘although “liturgy” is 
used almost exclusively today in connection with church services, it original referred to how 
people lived…Liturgy was never intended to be something merely done on a Sunday. Instead, 
liturgy is a way of live’ (2013, 24). Similarly, Smith, who has written extensively on the 
philosophy of liturgy, writes of human persons as homo liturgicus, that is, as creatures who are 
shaped by certain rituals and practices which determine the kind of things they love, and, thus, 
the kind of people they are. For Smith, this is at the heart of the nature of liturgies, which are, as 
he defines it, ‘rituals of ultimate concern: rituals that are formative for identity, that inculcate 
particular visions of the good life, and do so in a way that means to trump other ritual 
formations’ (2009, 86). As Smith describes it, liturgy is pervasive in all aspects of human life, and 
not restricted merely to the practices of the Church.  
 Yet, there is also a much narrower sense of ‘liturgy’ which is more often discussed by 
philosophers. As Benson notes (borrowing from Charles P. Price and Louis Weill (1979)), we 
can make a distinction between ‘intensive liturgy’, that is, the worship of a gathered group of 
religious believers, and ‘extensive liturgy’, that is, how these religious believers act in their daily 
lives after gathered worship disperses (2012, 128). As Benson is keen to stress, these two kinds 
of liturgy cannot be disconnected—liturgical worship does not stop when one leaves a place of 
worship. However, this narrower intensive use of liturgy is much closer to how the word is used in 
much of the analytic work on the subject. As Wolterstorff observes, whilst the word ‘liturgy’ is 
used more broadly to refer to extensive liturgies, the focus of his own work is that of the 
scripted worship of a Christian community (2018, 11-12). As he goes on to define it,  
 
An enactment of a liturgy consists of the participants together performing scripted 
verbal, gestural and auditory actions, the prescribed purpose of their doing so being both 
to engage God directly in acts of learning and acknowledging the excellence of who God 
is and what God has done, and to be engaged by God. And the liturgy itself is that type 
of sequence of act-types that is enacted when the participants do what the script 
prescribes. (2018, 29-3) 
 
In this article, I focus primarily on philosophical approaches to intensive liturgy, of the kind 
described here by Wolterstorff. There appears to be little disagreement as to how to define 
‘intensive liturgy’, and Wolterstorff’s definition seems broadly compatible with many of the other 
accounts discussed. It’s important to note, from the beginning, that liturgy is not something 
practiced only in formal or traditional Churches. As Wolterstorff observes, even worship with no 
written script or liturgical text should be considered ‘liturgical’, since there is always a script 
involved in worship, even if this is implicit (2015, 9). There are right and wrong ways of 
worshipping in such contexts, and cultural expectations of how one should act, even if these are 
as minimal as standing up to sing a hymn, or not heckling when the preacher is speaking.  
In this two-part article, I outline two areas of philosophical study within this growing 
literature: the nature of liturgical action and the epistemology of liturgy. For, whilst the literature 
on philosophy and liturgy is relatively small, it’s also remarkably broad in subject matter. There 
has been work on the intersection between liturgy and the philosophy of desire and emotion,3 
                                                     
3 Smith, 2009; Cuneo 2016, 20-37. 
ethics,4 political philosophy,5 philosophy of language,6 as well as the problem of divine 
hiddenness.7 However, the questions ‘What are we doing when we participate in liturgy?’ and 
‘What can we know by participating in liturgy?’ appear to have been recurring questions in much 
of this literature, and so these are the two questions I will consider. In the first part of this article, 
I consider the relationship between liturgy and philosophy of action, and in the second part 
article, I consider recent work on the epistemology of liturgy.  
 
Acting Liturgically 
What are we doing when we engage in liturgy? This has been a question which has been 
addressed by many of those writing on the philosophy of liturgy. As Terence Cuneo observes, 
‘to the untrained eye’ the liturgies of his own tradition, the Eastern Orthodox Church, appear to 
be a ‘jumble of disconnected actions’ (2016, 154), such as ‘kissing, standing, bowing, prostrating, 
chanting, singing, anointing, processing, praying, kneeling, sensing, reading, listening, eating, 
washing, vesting…and even spitting’ (2016, 154). With ‘increased exposure’, Cuneo suggests, one 
would come to see that such actions aren’t random, disconnected events, but, rather, scripted 
actions which form the part of a central pattern of engaging God by blessing, petitioning and 
offering thanks to God (2016, 156).  
 Wolterstorff agrees that liturgy primarily has to do with engaging God in important ways. 
He suggests that, ‘[l]iturgy is a species of ritual’ which ‘has to do with God. More specifically, 
when enacting a liturgy the participants orient themselves toward God…When we orient 
ourselves toward God by enacting a liturgy we engage God directly and explicitly’ (2018, 27). 
Moreover, whilst we might use the term ‘liturgy’ to refer to a text used in communal worship, 
Wolterstorff claims that ‘a liturgical text exists not for its own sake but for the sake of 
enactments of the liturgy’ (2015, 4). As Wolterstorff defines it, liturgy is a ‘universal’, that is, 
something which ‘can be repeatedly enacted’ (2015, 4). More specifically, liturgies are ‘types of 
sequences of actions of certain kinds’ that always include bodily actions (such as ‘listening, 
speaking, singing…crossing oneself, distributing bread and wine…and more besides’ (2015, 5)) 
as well as non-bodily actions such as blessing and thanking. In the context of liturgy, bodily 
actions ‘count as performances of actions that are not bodily’ (2015, 5). As Cuneo expands this 
point, bodily acts ‘do not merely accompany the linguistic acts prescribed by the liturgical script’ 
but, rather, in the context of liturgy, these bodily actions ‘count as cases of engaging God by 
blessing, petitioning and thanking God’ (2016, 156). 
 According to Cuneo, successfully thanking God in the liturgy doesn’t depend on having 
a specific mental state: ‘to thank someone at some time, one needn’t be feeling gratitude at that 
time’ (2016, 157), but requires only that the relevant intention is present. If the agent wants to 
thank God by repeating the words of the liturgical script ‘thanks be to God’, whilst she doesn’t 
need to feel gratitude, she does need to intend that this speech-act count as an instance of 
thanking God. Wolterstorff makes a similar point in his discussion of whether having faith in 
God is required for successfully performing liturgical actions. Wolterstorff suggests that in the 
instance of someone who utters, ‘Thanks be to God’, ‘on the off-chance and in the hope that 
God does exist and is the sort of being who can be thanked and who is worthy of being thanked’ 
(2018, 104); if such a God does exist, then this person has thanked God. Wolterstorff even goes 
as far as suggesting that ‘[i]f it is the intention of the participant, when performing the prescribed 
verbal and gestural acts, that he not thereby perform the prescribed acts of worship, then he has 
not performed them; otherwise he has’ (2018, 108).  
 Whilst, for Cuneo and Wolterstorff, the success conditions of acting liturgically don’t 
depend on the agent’s mental states or beliefs, but only their intentions (or absence of negative 
                                                     
4 Wolterstorff, 2011, 2018: 249-273; Cuneo, 2016: 88-106, 37-52. 
5 Smith, 2017. 
6 Wolterstorff, 1995, 2015. 
7 Cuneo, 2016: 52-66. 
intentions), liturgical acts can be evaluated in terms of how appropriately they engage God. For 
instance, in the case of the person who thanks God without having faith in God, Wolterstorff 
thinks such a person thanks God, but writes that this ‘is not a well-formed instance of thanking 
God’ (2018, 104). Cuneo suggests that the liturgical script provides us with the opportunity not 
only to engage God simpliciter, but also to engage God appropriately. Just as in ordinary social 
situations there are apt and inapt ways of expressing thanks (writing a letter as a means of 
expressing thanks for passing the salt appears to be an inapt way of expressing thanks, for 
instance (2016, 164)), Cuneo suggests that ‘the liturgical script…repeatedly draws attention to the 
fact that the ways of acting it prescribes are not inapt’ (2016, 164).  
Smith also describes himself as developing an account of ‘Christian action’ (2013, 4) in 
reference to both intensive and extensive liturgies. He writes that ‘worship is best understood on 
the order of action not reflection; worship is something we do’ (2009, 166). Smith’s philosophy 
of liturgical action is rooted in his account of anthropology. Rejecting an account of human 
beings as primarily rational beings, Smith depicts human beings as desiring, ritualistic, embodied 
creatures. All of our liturgical action (whether that be through the rituals of the intensive liturgy 
of a Church tradition, or the rituals which undergird how think, eat, shop and relate to each 
other) should be seen as intentional actions, (2009, 48), even if this intentionality exists only at 
 a pre-reflective and non-cognitive level (2009, 50-51). Indeed, Smith thinks, this kind of non-
cognitive mode is our ‘default way of intending the world’ (2009, 50-51). Smith’s account of 
liturgical action is explained in terms of desire: ‘What distinguishes us’ as human beings, he 
writes, ‘is not whether we love, but what we love’ (2009, 52). Thus, for Smith, acting liturgically is 
guided by our desires, rather than our rational decision-making.  
 Smith’s account of acting liturgically then informs his account of what it is to engage in 
the liturgies of Christian worship. As he describes it, the role of Christian liturgies is to help the 
worshipper cultivate habits which can orientate their action towards God’s goodness in a way 
that becomes second-nature to them. ‘The practices of Christian worship’, Smith writes, provide 
‘an understanding of our environment that is precognitive and becomes inscribed in our adaptive 
unconscious’ (2009, 68). For Smith, one of the important roles of Christian worship is to 
‘form—or better, reform—our habits and dispositions’ (2013, 166) from those entrenched in us 
by culture which run counter to God’s purposes for us. It does this, he claims, not by ‘providing 
new knowledge’ of the points of difference between culture and Christianity, but, rather, he 
writes, by providing a kind of ‘“dispositional deflection” and rehabitulation of our desires and 
loves’ (2013, 166). Given the importance of habitualation (and rehabitulation) of our desires in 
Smith’s account of liturgy, Smith puts an important emphasis on repetition—he suggests that 
‘[i]f Christian worship is going to be formative, it has to be repetitive’ (2013, 185).8 This 
emphasis on liturgy’s repetitiveness points to another important feature of acting liturgically—
the need for a liturgical script.  
 
Scripted liturgical action  
As Wolterstorff describes it, ‘Those who participate in enacting some liturgy do so by following 
what I shall call a script, the result being scripted activity’ (2018, 13). In a number of places, 
Wolterstorff makes comparisons between the ontology of liturgy and the ontology of music to 
explain the relation between a script and the performance of some act-type (2015, 5). In the 
performance of some orchestral symphony, for instance, a musician follows a score to guide her 
to perform a certain sequence of sounds, and, he argues, ‘the musical work is the sound 
sequence type that is instantiated when the correctness-rules that the composer has instantiated 
are faithfully followed’ (2015, 6). Similarly, the liturgical script of a particular tradition ‘specifies a 
set of rules for a correct liturgical enactment’ (2015, 7), which, in turn allows for the 
performance of certain acts of worship. Wolterstorff notes that scripts can be followed ‘correctly 
                                                     
8 Wolterstorff considers the importance of repetition in liturgical scripts in Acting Liturgically (2018, 148-170). 
or incorrectly’ (2018, 15), even if these correctness rules are often ‘tradition-specific’ (2015, 8). 
Thus, just as a team of American football players can execute their game plan correctly or 
incorrectly, a congregation can follow a liturgical script correctly or incorrectly. To follow a 
liturgical script correctly, requires suspending acting on one’s own judgement ‘as to what would 
be good to do and instead follow the script’ (2018, 15). This requires a kind of submission to the 
authorities of one’s tradition, Wolterstorff thinks — 'to be inducted into the tradition of Catholic 
liturgical practice is to be confronted with the authority of that tradition’ (2018, 51).  
Yet, whilst a tradition determines the actions one is to perform in engaging God, a script 
cannot prescribe all the actions that should be performed (2018, 16)— ‘the script for enacting a 
particular liturgy is never fully specified by a text, nor by a text supplemented by oral directives. 
Always some of the prescriptions constituting the script are embedded within the social practice 
of that particular religious community for enacting its liturgies’ (2018, 20). As Smith describes, 
there is a kind of irreducible logic of practice which can only be acquired by being embedded in a 
liturgical community (2013, 77). Thus, whilst liturgical scripts prescribe some of the actions 
involved in engaging God liturgically, some of our liturgical behaviour must be learned through 
experience.  
This importance of performing actions which aren’t prescribed by the liturgical script, 
but which are part of acting liturgically is developed in more detail by Benson. Like Wolterstorff, 
Benson makes comparisons between music and liturgy, but instead of making the comparison 
with an orchestral score, Benson thinks of liturgy as a kind of improvised jazz (2013, 9). He 
writes that, ‘in jazz, knowing the past is what makes the future possible. In the same way, 
learning to be a Christian improviser, one must know the entire context: Scripture and the ways in 
which Scripture has been interpreted in the past. In short, one must be part of a community of 
improvisers’ (2013, 42). As Benson notes, jazz is not without a script or certain rules of 
correctness—but, rather, our improvisations must take place against the backdrop of this script. 
Thus, he claims that, ‘[n]ot only are many “improvisations” often significantly “scripted,” but 
spontaneity is only possible when one is well prepared…It takes a great deal of work to be 
spontaneous’ (2012, 41). The same is true in the use of Christian liturgy; Benson describes the 
ideal of Christian liturgical action as a kind of scripted spontaneity (2013, 140) which is made 
possible by closely following a script but being prepared to adapt and modify one’s performance 
of the script. Whilst liturgy is always scripted and repetitive, Benson states that, ‘there is still a 
difference between one repetition and another, in the same way that there is a difference 
between one performance of a symphony and another’ (2013, 141).9 
 
Bodily liturgical action  
As I’ve already described, many of the liturgical actions involved in following a liturgical script 
involve agents performing bodily actions. On Wolterstorff’s and Cuneo’s accounts, in the 
context of Christian worship, these bodily actions count as instances of engaging God by 
thanking, blessing and petitioning God. Another important aspect of acting liturgically is that 
these actions are bodily. In his most recent work, Wolterstorff expands this account in more 
detail. Here he suggests that there is a kind of joining of body and mind in the acts of liturgical 
worship. It’s not the case, he suggests, that uttering words of thanks causes my thanking God, but, 
rather, ‘I perform that act by using my tongue and vocal chords to utter the words “Thanks be to 
God.” … My uttering of the words counts as my thanking God. My act of uttering the words and 
my act of thanking God are joined together so that the former counts as the latter’ (2018, 85). As 
Wolterstorff suggests, bodily actions are integral to liturgy. Without our bodies, ‘there would be 
no declaration of pardon and no blessing of the people…there would be no singing…[and] there 
                                                     
9 As Smith suggests, the fact that following a liturgy depends on being embedded in a liturgical community, means 
that theorizing about liturgy will never get at the irreducible ‘logic of practice’ (2013, 77), pointing to one of the 
limits of philosophical thinking about liturgy. He writes that, ‘any adequate interpretation of what’s going on in such 
a community of practice will need to resist the temptation to construe practitioners as implicit theorizers’ (2013, 77).  
would be no sacraments’ (2018, 90), and thus, we wouldn’t have access to the goods these things 
make possible.10  
Smith’s account of acting liturgically gives an important role to bodily action, perhaps 
more so than any other account. As I’ve already described, Smith thinks of liturgy as a kind of 
habitual outworking of our desires. It’s essential to this account, to realise that we exist as 
embodied creatures in the world: ‘We are in the world primarily as doers, not thinkers—and ever 
our thinking serves, and grows out of our doing. We are certainly more than our bodies, but we 
are never less than that’ (2012, 113). Indeed, one of the crucial ways in which Christian liturgies 
can counter the liturgies of culture is through bodily action. He writes that  
 
gestures are not just something we do but…they also do something to us…kneeling for 
confession is a kind of cosmological act that inscribes in us a comportment to God and 
neighbour, a way of being-in-the-world that inks into our bones and becomes 
sedimented into the core our being through the crackle of our old knees. The postures of 
our bodies spill out beyond the sanctuary and become postures of existential 
comportment to the world. (2013, 167) 
 
Finally, as Wolterstorff suggests, one of the crucial values of the bodily dimension of acting 
liturgically is that it allows us to worship communally (2018, 90). He argues that, without our 
bodies, ‘the communal dimension of liturgical enactments…would be entirely missing’ (2018, 
90). It is to this aspect of liturgy which I now turn.  
 
Communal liturgical action 
As many in the literature have pointed out, the intensive liturgy of the Church is not performed 
by individuals but by communities and congregations. Wolterstorff writes, ‘The church blesses 
God, praises God, thanks God, confess her sins to God, petitions God, listens to God’s Word, 
celebrates the Eucharist. It’s not the individual members who do these things simultaneously; it’s 
the assembled body that does these things’ (2015, 11). Similarly, Smith argues that ‘worship is 
not a private affair; we have gathered as a people, as a congregation, and just as together we are 
dependent on our redeeming Creator, so too are we dependent on one another. All the parts of 
the body are dependent upon other parts and organs in order for the individual parts (“me”) to 
function and flourish’ (2009, 169). Thus, giving an account of the importance of acting 
communally is important for giving an account of acting liturgically.  
Both Cuneo and Wolterstorff have attempted to apply work in the philosophy of 
collective intention to explain the corporate aspect of communal worship. Cuneo draws on work 
by John Searle (1990, 2010) and Wolterstorff, Michael Bratman (2009). In Cuneo’s discussion of 
liturgical singing, for instance, there is a kind of interlocking of individual intentions and a 
responsiveness to others which means that it is the congregation and not the individuals who 
should be regarded as the agents of liturgical singing. To explain how this might be so, Cuneo 
suggests that Searle’s model of collective intention can give such an account. Thus, on Searle’s 
account, when cooperation is present in this way, the structure of our intentions is different. To 
take an example which Searle uses, that of the piano/violin duet (2010, 52), it’s not that I intend 
that I play the piano whilst believing that you play the violin. That is, for Searle, acting together 
isn’t a case of us both individually intending to act at the same time. But, rather, as he describes 
it,  
                                                     
10 Cuneo (2017) also considers the religious worth of bodily liturgical actions in a recent article which is not included 
in his Ritualized Faith collection. He writes that bodily liturgical actions ‘have religious worth, in part, because their 
performance is expressive of the religious attitudes, which themselves have religious worth. More importantly, the 
worth of these actions is not wholly determined by the attitudes that agents are in…when performing these actions 
but also the attitudes that God has to their performance’ (2017, 18).  
 
 
[w]e are performing a duet where I play the piano part and you play the violin part. Here 
our playing does not cause the duet to be performed. My playing and your playing simply 
constitute the performance of the duet. So from my point of view, I have a collective 
intention-in-action that we ply the duet by way of me playing the piano, in a context where I 
take it for granted that you are playing the violin. (2010, 52; emphasis in the original)  
 
In Searle’s example, my intention is a collective intention (or a ‘we-intention’) rather than an 
individual intention. Searle thinks that it’s not the case that I merely intend to play the piano and 
I believe that you will play the violin, as he thinks some accounts of collective intention describe; 
rather, the content of my intention is different when I act cooperatively than when I act 
individually—I intend to act collectively. Now, whilst Searle thinks that I must have certain 
beliefs about what the other will do, these beliefs aren’t what make my intention collective; 
instead, there is something irreducible about the nature of my intention when I act cooperatively. 
In harmony with Searle’s thought, Cuneo writes, 
 
Group singing clearly seems to satisfy the criteria for collective action specified above: it 
requires the requisite “we intentions,” that these intentions fit together in the right ways, 
and awareness of one another’s intentions… to engage in group singing also requires that 
I adjust my singing to yours and that you adjust your singing to mine in “real time,” often 
in ways that are not dictated by the score that we are following. (2016, 138) 
 
For Searle, the ‘we-intentions’ described above are an irreducible phenomenon of group action 
which resist further analysis. For this reason, Wolterstorff prefers to analyse group liturgical 
actions using Bratman’s (2009) analysis in which we-intentions are individual intentions which 
mesh, or interlock, in some way. Wolterstorff suggests that, ‘when the participants in some 
liturgical enactment come together they don’t do any such thing as come to agreement with each other 
over their actions. Joint action automatically results from each participant intending to fill his or 
her role in together following the script. Shared joint-action intentions that interlock emerge 
automatically’ (2018, 63). Yet, whilst joint-intention is necessary for acting together, it’s not 
sufficient, as there must also be the kind of mutual responsiveness Cuneo describes in his 
account liturgical singing. Wolterstorff observes that ‘if one person…says the creed very slowly 
and another says it very quickly, they are not saying the creed together’ (2018, 64; emphasis in the 
original).  
Whilst the application of the material on collective intention has its uses, it also has its 
short-comings. It might seem to some to suggest something too homogenous about the nature 
of corporate liturgical action, particularly to those from less formal liturgical traditions. As 
Benson notes, true worship should be recognised as a community providing ‘multiple voices’ 
(2013, 94). Yet, he argues, rather than thinking of liturgical communities as providing a polyphony 
of voices which blend together to provide ‘pleasing harmony’, we should instead think of liturgy 
as providing a heterophony of voices, which remain ‘distinct and sometimes dissonant’ (2013, 94). 
Liturgical worship which promotes heterophony, Benson notes, involves everyone in the 
community as part of the worship—whether that be lay members, pastors, priests or children. 
Benson’s point isn’t aimed at the accounts of collective action given by Cuneo or Wolterstorff, 
but it points to an important limitation of their accounts of collective intention in liturgy. In 
recent work, Joshua Cockayne (forthcoming) suggests that one limitation of collective intention 
accounts of group action is that they exclude neuro-atypical individuals from participating in 
liturgy. Cockayne points to the psychological literature on autism to make this point—many 
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder have difficulty engaging in the kind of intention 
meshing and mutual responsiveness described in Wolterstorff and Cuneo’s accounts. This isn’t 
to say that such accounts have no value, but just that they are limited in what they can explain. 
Cockayne then proposes a model of group action, by drawing from the work of Christian List 
and Philip Pettit (2011). According to List and Pettit, if a group is structured appropriately, it can 
meet the conditions for agency. They suggest that groups are capable of acting and responding 
to their environment in such a way that they can be considered responsible for acting. Cockayne 
suggests that such a model might help to explain how a diverse group of individuals could 
contribute to the worship of the church as a group, even if they are unable to jointly intend to 
perform acts of sung or spoken liturgy.  
 
Future directions in the philosophy of liturgy 
Much of the philosophy of liturgical action has focused on what we do when we participate in 
liturgy, but yet, human beings aren’t the only agents acting in the liturgy of the Church. 
Theologically, much importance has been given to the work of the Holy Spirit in the worship of 
the Church. Whilst Wolterstorff has offered an account of what God is doing in the liturgy in his 
account of what the liturgy assumes about God’s actions in The God we Worship, as well as a brief 
discussion of God’s liturgical actions in Acting Liturgically, the work of the Holy Spirit in liturgy 
remains something which deserves more attention from philosophers.  
 A related theological issue which would undoubtedly expand the conversation in 
liturgical philosophy is a discussion of ecclesiology. Whilst I’ve highlighted some accounts of 
what it is for the Church to act together by using liturgy, this discussion would be improved by 
getting clear on the question of just what the Church is. What is the relationship between 
individual members of the Church, church communities, and the worldwide Church? This is 
surely a vital question if we are to make sense of what it is for those within the Church to engage 
in acting liturgically. Moreover, this is a discussion which I think philosophers could contribute a 
great deal to, by applying insights from work on social ontology and mereology.   
 In the second part of this article, I consider how liturgy might provide not just a way of 
acting, but also a way of knowing. I summarise the recent discussions of liturgical epistemology 
by explaining how liturgy can provide a way to know God personally.  
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